Elsewhere in the multiverse…
On February 24, 2022 Russia invades Ukraine. The United Nations Security Council, consisting of the African Union, Brazil, China, the European Union, India, Russia, and the United States, passes a legally binding resolution to end the invasion. China abstains and Russia attempts to veto, but the other members have a veto-proof supermajority.
The resolution calls for the world’s militaries to provide assistance to Ukraine. All UN member states are legally bound to sanction Russia until it complies. In the face of overwhelming global opposition, Russia sues for peace.
Meanwhile on Earth as we know it…
On February 24, 2022 Russia invades Ukraine. The United Nations Security Council, consisting of the United States, Russia, China, and ex-colonial powers the United Kingdom and France vote on a resolution calling on Russia to “immediately, completely, and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.” No means of enforcement are specified, but it matters little as it is vetoed by Russia anyway. Hundreds of thousands are displaced or die. Ukraine is left to its fate.
The UN’s inefficacy is disappointing, but is it destiny? Perhaps. But even now, the UN is not as toothless as it seems. Indeed it could have a much stronger bite, if only its members would unmuzzle its jaws and loosen its leash.
A United Nations with Teeth
The thought experiment we just posed, although flawed, has merit. The main problem is that even with different members and rules at the Security Council, and even in a world where reluctant powers such as China are somehow legally bound to assist, nuclear-armed aggressors like Russia are impossible to challenge directly by other great powers without risking escalation to nuclear war. Yet the international order so described, especially with legally binding sanctions, would have altered the incentives for Russia to wage war in the first place, tilting the outcome towards peace.
To get to that world, the great powers would have to cede some freedom of foreign policy making in the interest of an order where the price for wars of aggression is higher and more certain to be paid. But if the global powers were unified, which by definition without Russia they are not, even in this world the range of tools available to them within the existing United Nations framework is theoretically extensive.
The Security Council is authorized to take action to maintain international peace and security under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Such action may include armed force. The U.N. is therefore not powerless to respond should it so choose, and it has chosen to respond powerfully in the past.
When North Korea invaded South Korea in June 1950, the Security Council passed resolution 83, which noted the requirement for urgent military measures to restore international peace and security and recommended that "Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.”
The United Nations can also intervene with peacekeeping operations, of which there have been more than 70 since 1948. And it has sanctions, under Article 41, which encompass a broad range of non-violent enforcement options. Since 1966, the Security Council has established 30 such regimes.
The mandates of its programs, agencies, and offices deliver numerous services, and even occasionally put human values ahead of the interests of member governments, which leads to conflict with member states.
And in the wake of the Russian invasion, the UN has not done nothing. True, Russia vetoed draft resolution S/2022/155 which called on it to withdraw from Ukraine. But even now, there are limits to the power of the veto. Russia was not able to prevent the Security Council from calling an Emergency Session of the General Assembly, the first of its kind in 40 years and only the 11th in the UN’s history.
Under General Assembly resolution 377A(V), passed in 1950, the world body resolved that if the Council, owing to a lack of unanimity of the permanent members, failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to members for collective measures, including the use of armed force when necessary.
The UN General Assembly voted 141 to 5 to demand an immediate halt to Moscow’s attack and the withdrawal of all Russian troops, though it did not provide for military force or any other enforcement measures, though it may have had legal authority to do so., The Human Rights Council passed a resolution to establish a commission of inquiry to investigate violations committed during Russia’s military attack on Ukraine. Other organs are delivering important services, such as providing humanitarian aid, tracking displaced persons, and monitoring casualties.
The weakness of the UN therefore, does not lay in limitations on its powers, which are theoretically broad. Its toothiness depends on the willingness of its members to bite. And what was once observed by Benito Mussolini of the League of Nations remains true of the UN: "the League is very well when sparrows shout, but no good at all when eagles fall out."
Towards a New United Nations
So really, the problem lies in the lack of unity among the most powerful states. Where their core interests are concerned, the UN is little able to compel them. Contrary to the febrile exaggerations of right-wing populists, the UN is not and was not established as an authority above nations. It is but one of the forums in which global diplomacy plays out, though in ambition and occasional practice it may stray into loftier territory. And though it is large and slow moving, it is not frozen or beyond reform. The United Nations has changed before, and it will change again. And where the roles of the great powers are concerned, our focus naturally falls on the Security Council, and whether any change to that institution could realistically prevent the Ukraine war or, falling short of that goal, make the United Nations a more modern, representative, and effective institution.
As most already know, the composition of the current Security Council enthroned the victors of the Second World War in their permanent seats. But there have been subsequent reforms. The UN Charter has been amended five times. In 1965, Article 23 was amended to enlarge the Security Council from 11 to 15 members and Article 27 was amended to increase the required number of Security Council votes from 7 to 9. In 1971, the Taiwan-based Republic of China was replaced by the mainland People’s Republic of China as a permanent seat holder. In 1991, the Russian Federation succeeded the Soviet Union’s seat and permanent membership at the Security Council.
This isn’t even the first United Nations. The League of Nations, founded after the First World War, was the first intergovernmental organization whose principal mission was to maintain world peace. The permanent members of its Executive Council were Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. But the United States, despite proposing its existence, failed to join, and the aggressor states of the 1930s—Japan, Italy, and Germany—left when it suited them.
Which illustrates the difficulty of reforming the UN today. Any attempt to strip a permanent member of the security council of its veto would mean they would probably just up and leave. According to Article 108 of the Charter, amendments must be adopted by two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified by two thirds of the members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council. But despite this hurdle, reform must and will proceed in time, to enhance its legitimacy, and as a precondition for even limited world government more capable of regulating violent conflict between nations.
It seems painfully obvious the former colonial powers the United Kingdom and France should both lose their seats and be replaced by the European Union, Brexit notwithstanding. The UK and France represent less than 2 percent of the world’s population combined. And the European Union would be an interesting trial balloon for the workability of supranational unions as security council members. With its 500 million people and 27 member states, it would be far more representative than France alone, and may be a satisfactory outcome for longtime permanent Security Council aspirant Germany. The EU has already demonstrated immense progress in coordinating joint foreign policy, has an existing diplomatic bureaucracy in the form of the EU External Action Service, and has enjoyed permanent observer status at the UN since 1974 and enhanced participation rights since 2011.
Now that the UK has left the EU, only the French would have to be convinced to give up their seat—no small request to be sure. One would expect the United Kingdom’s obstinacy in refusing to relinquish a permanent seat to be at least equal to the fragility of its claim in the 21st century. Most rankings of global military strength place the UK in the top 10, but never in the top 5. Given its isolationist political trends, small population compared to other contenders like India or Brazil, diminished global influence since the Second World War, and the current overrepresentation of predominantly white, European countries as permanent council members, the time has long past for the UK to make a gracious exit.
But the status quo is not without its merits. Certainly the United States has no interest in losing a reliable ally like the UK on the council. Its influence would be a necessary precondition to a UK exit. This would come at a potentially significant cost in relations with the UK. But it would prove a boon for relations with more important and representative countries or supranational institutions that replace it.
An EU seat also calls to mind the possibility of a seat for the African Union. The African Union’s common position on the reform of the United Nations, articulated in the “The Ezulwini Consensus”—named for the valley in central Swaziland where the agreement was made— proposes two permanent seats for its members. Whatever configuration representation for Africa might take, it can be little argued that the nearly 1 and a half billion people on the continent should not be represented in some fashion as permanent seat holders. The same goes for South America, where Brazil is often cited as a contender for permanent seat holder (although it is hard to see how its diplomatic reputation under Jair Bolsonaro could be so rewarded). Although its supranational institutions, such as the Union of South American Nations, Mercosur are not as advanced, who knows what the future may hold. The same might also be said of the Arab League. And despite clear conflicts of interest with Pakistan, India has nearly the same population of Africa and is a rising power that will be increasingly owed its due.
The so-called G-4 nations, Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan each support each other’s bids for permanent seats on the security council. They have strong claims but are opposed by regional rivals. Under the banner of “Uniting for Consensus” these nations worry that an increase of permanent seats would further accentuate the disparity between these member countries and result in the extension of a series of privileges with a cascade effect to the detriment of smaller UN members. In 2017, it was reported that the G4 nations were willing to temporarily forgo veto power if granted a permanent UNSC seat.
Which raises the prospect of not only changes to membership, but changes to rules. In the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there have been renewed calls to place limits on the veto power of the permanent members, including restricting them from vetoing resolutions on conflicts in which they are involved, or resolutions related to grave human rights violations.
Conclusions
The UN was forged in the crucible of power politics and only there can it be reforged. The powerful may only cede their stranglehold to stranglers. And only when the rising powers demand their seats will their spot at the table be guaranteed. Perhaps only if they threaten to leave will the permanent 5 concede.
But new contenders will have to be diplomatic. According to the UN Charter, expanding the security council will require amendments that must be adopted by two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified by two thirds of the members of the United Nations.
Still, if a new multilateral age is dawning a multilateral balance of power must be reflected. And if the member states, large or small, truly want a world without war, it is in their interests to accept change, and give up a little power in order to get a more stable international environment.
Though changes to membership of the Security Council may be long overdue, we should also be cautious about claims it will necessarily lead to better outcomes. In the current Ukraine crisis, India has not sanctioned Russia, due its historic ties. In fact, much of the world has yet to impose any penalties on Russia, with many states preferring to stay neutral in European conflicts, even in the face of aggression.
For now, I for one say a better a weak UN than none. It is often quipped that if it did not exist it would have to be invented. But the fact of its existence does not rule out reinvention, from time to time, as the generations who inherit it see fit.